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CHAPTER 10
Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the 
Unemployment Insurance System
Extent, Measurement, and Correction
Burman Skrable
UI Service, U.S. Department of Labor
This chapter examines the extent of financial losses or leakages in 
the federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United 
States. "Leakages" or "losses" will be used interchangeably to refer to 
funds due the UI system that it failed to receive, benefits wrongly paid 
out, and other resources lost. Where possible, the chapter attempts to 
distinguish losses resulting from intentional (fraudulent) actions by 
claimants, employers and UI agency staff from those occurring for 
nonfraudulent reasons.
The UI system is a major social insurance program in the United 
States. In fiscal year (FY) 1995, a year of relatively low unemploy 
ment, total UI program benefit payments amounted to $21 billion, state 
tax collections (contributions) were $23 billion, federal collections for 
various federal and federal-state extended benefit programs and admin 
istration were $5.5 billion, and allocations to state employment secu 
rity agencies (SESAs) for administration were $3.6 billion. Due to the 
size and complexity of the system, the incentives facing claimants and 
employers, and the limited administrative funding available to enforce 
compliance, the UI system contains many areas of opportunity for the 
inappropriate use of funds. Policy makers, as well as other stakeholders 
in the system, want to know the causes of errors and misuses as well as 
the scale of fraud and abuse, so that these problems can be minimized.
In a discussion of the loss of funds from a social insurance system 
due to error or fraud, the legal and economic views are related but not
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identical, and both are of interest. The law's main concern is whether 
the losses are fraudulent or erroneous. Legally, the question is the fol 
lowing: did the person willfully or intentionally misrepresent facts 
affecting benefit eligibility or tax liability? Although state laws vary 
considerably in whether any given action involving the UI system 
involves fraud, all states have much more severe penalties and can 
exercise a greater variety of recovery options in the case of fraud. The 
range of state fraud laws must be kept in mind whenever a national 
estimate of "UI fraud" is offered.
The economic view is broader and concerned more with knowing 
why payment errors occur so that they can be prevented. Economists 
also want to know the size of errors, so that the costs and benefits of 
prevention or recovery strategies can be determined. Economists tend 
toward a threefold classification of overpayments. First, there are small 
random mistakes due to inadvertence by both UI staff and claimants or 
employers. Second, in complex programs such as UI, characterized by 
many involved provisions for benefit eligibility and tax liability, the 
range of errors due to lack of knowledge or the time to make thorough 
determinations is considerable. Such errors would be systematically 
related to the complexity of the program but can be reduced by better 
training of staff, systematizing procedures, and educating claimants 
and employers. Third, some claimants and employers will intentionally 
cheat. Economists go beyond merely calling this "fraud" to analyzing 
the extent to which the system provides incentives and disincentives 
for such behavior. They reason that certain individuals weigh the bene 
fits of cheating against its "cost" in terms of the likelihood of being 
detected and the penalty they face if caught and act accordingly to 
maximize their incomes. In the case of UI, the balance of incentives 
certainly appears to favor fraudulent behavior. The rules are complex. 
Claimants and employers provide crucial information that is expensive 
to verify. Administrative budgets to process tax and benefit actions are 
spare. Because of the desire to ensure customer service and to meet 
promptness standards, timeliness has been emphasized over accuracy. 
Thus, the chance of detection is low. Penalties are relatively light in 
most cases. 1
This chapter is organized around a description of the major UI 
resource flows, since these constitute the potential sources for misuse 
through errors and fraud. At each critical point in the review, the size of
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the basic funding flow is identified, and the potential for leakage at the 
point is explained. If leakages at that point are regularly measured by 
the current system of monitoring, current practice is described, and a 
brief historical sketch is provided of the development of the present 
measurement or assessment approach. The most recent estimate of 
leakages at that point will also be given, along with what has been done 
or is being done to stanch the outflows, recover overpayments, or col 
lect outstanding debts.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of some technical issues 
and measurement gaps. The main ones involve measuring: (1) the 
extent to which current estimates from the Benefits Quality Control 
(BQC)2 program of dollar overpayments actually represent true dollar 
losses to the UI system, (2) the accuracy of claims denial decisions, 
and (3) the degree to which employers comply with contributions (pay 
roll tax) laws.
Major Financial and Information Flows 
in the Unemployment Insurance System
Figure 10.1 outlines the principal financial and information flows 
that characterize the UI system. In nearly all cases, each financial flow 
is accompanied by a counterflowing stream of information from claim 
ants and employers. Very often, the information is essential to deter 
mining the proper size of the corresponding financial flow. In fact, the 
opportunity for fraud or other abuse often arises from the fact that the 
beneficiary or taxpayer controls the information. This is the essential 
moral hazard problem in principal-agent relations. The six important 
flows depicted in figure 10.1 are each described in the following sub 
sections.
The Benefits Flow
In the UI process, the state employment security agency (SESA) 
obtains information from individuals when they file an initial or contin 
ued claim for benefits. This is combined with data from employers on 
the person's base-period earnings and/or weeks of work and reason for
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separation. Together, this material allows the SESA to determine initial 
monetary and nonmonetary eligibility for UI benefits and subsequently 
to make benefit payments. In fourteen of the past twenty-five years, 
benefit payments were the largest financial flow in the UI system. In 
calendar year (CY) 1994, the UI benefit payment outflow was approxi 
mately $22.6 billion. Benefit payments included the following main 
components:
• Regular state UI $21.657 billion
• Federal-state extended 0.220
• Ex-Federal Employees UCFE) 0.275
• Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) 0.347
• Disaster Unemployment Assistance 0.114
»Trade Readjustment Allowances 0.130
Total $22.743 billion
State Contributions and Reimbursements
Over 98 percent of the 6 million employing units covered by the 
system are subject to UI payroll tax contributions and are referred to as 
"contributory employers." They make quarterly contributions (tax pay 
ments) to the UI trust fund based on their taxable quarterly wages and 
their SESA-determined tax rate. Most employer tax rates are experi 
ence rated: after a lag of one to three years, depending on the state, the 
UI tax rates of employers reflect the benefits paid to their former 
employees. For purposes of UI financing, the remaining 2 percent of 
Ul-covered employers are referred to as reimbursing employers. This 
group includes mostly state and local governmental units and nonprofit 
agencies. From the standpoint of UI, these employers are self-insured; 
they repay benefit charges dollar-for-dollar and are not subject to a 
state experience-rating tax scheme.
In CY 1994, the sources of funds were as follows:
• State Contributions $21.975 billion
• State Reimbursements 1.140
Total $23.115 billion
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Federal Unemployment Tax Act Revenues
In addition to making state UI tax payments, contributory employers 
remit a flat federal tax on wages paid to each employee. This tax, paid 
to the IRS, is 0.8 percent of annual wages up to the maximum of the 
federal taxable wage base, presently set at $7,000 per calendar year. 
These collections were approximately $5.5 billion in FY 1995. The 
revenue is apportioned by formula among the Employment Security 
Administration Account (ESAA), the Extended Unemployment Com 
pensation Account (EUCA), and the Federal Unemployment Account 
(FUA). (See the appendix to chapter 8.) In FY 1995, 85 percent of Fed 
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) revenue went to the ESAA.
Administrative Grants
From the ESSA, the federal government provides grants to states to 
administer the state and federal unemployment compensation pro 
grams, the Employment Service (ES), and the Veterans Employment 
and Training Service (VETS). The UI administrative grants are tied to 
the UI workload—benefit payment and tax collection activities. Each 
quarter, states receive a formula-driven base amount to fund their con 
tinuing program level. If their workload exceeds a certain amount, they 
may also claim additional contingency funding. In FY 1995, these 
costs amounted to $3.6 billion:
• State UI $2.3 billion
• Federal programs 0.2
•ES, VETS 1.1
UI Administration
As listed, in FY 1995 SESAs received $2.3 billion to administer 
their state UI programs and another $200 million to administer federal 
unemployment compensation programs. There is potential for fraudu 
lent state use of funds allocated to pay for administration.
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Trust Fund Operations
As noted, in FY 1995 the federal-state UI system collected some 
$23 billion from employers and paid out roughly the same amount in 
benefits to claimants. Money deposited to and withdrawn from the 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) accounts at the U.S. Treasury passes 
through state bank accounts called the UI Clearing Account on the way 
to the Treasury and the UI Benefit Payment Account on the way from 
the Treasury. Although states are legally required to deposit employer 
contributions and other monies for the unemployment fund (e.g., bene 
fit overpayment recoveries) and any interest earnings on those funds 
into the UTF, state treasurers and banks have an obvious financial 
motive for leaving unemployment funds in state bank accounts as long 
as possible, to defray bank charges through earnings on compensating 
balances.
The following sections describe the main risks of financial loss that 
may be encountered because of fraud or errors at each of the six points 
that have been summarized. Also reviewed is how the federal-state UI 
system now attempts to assess the risks and to measure the losses. A 
brief history of the development of the assessment approach is given, 
together with recent estimates of losses. The summary and conclusions 
section reviews how data have been used to prevent future losses and 
suggests further steps that might be taken.
Types of Benefit Payment Errors
UI provides temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right 
to involuntarily unemployed workers with substantial attachment to the 
labor force. States evaluate labor force attachment by reviewing the 
extent of work and/or earnings in a twelve-month base period preced 
ing the application for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, states 
closely scrutinize reasons for separation from work, as well as the 
claimant's continuing ability, availability, and degree of active work- 
search to ensure that the claimant is truly unemployed and not actually 
out of the labor force.
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Determining UI eligibility thus involves tests at three levels: (1) 
monetary, (2) separation, and (3) continuing eligibility. Risks for 
wrong payments or payments to ineligible persons exist at all stages. 
The common thread linking these risks is that of moral hazard: poten 
tial beneficiaries supply some of the information needed to determine 
benefit eligibility and therefore have the ability to withhold critical 
facts. Realities of time and cost force the UI system to accept informa 
tion provided by claimants and employers as valid, especially in the 
short term. This leaves the system open to many risks of improper pay 
ment. The following reviews the main risks at each eligibility level.
Losses Based on Monetary Eligibility
In all but two states, monetary eligibility is determined through 
examining computerized agency wage record data. These data are also 
used to set the weekly benefit amount for claimants deemed monetarily 
eligible. There are two main kinds of risks.
• A fictitious employer is an imaginary enterprise that establishes an 
employer account with the SESA. It submits bogus wage records 
for imaginary employees on whom it initially pays UI taxes. The 
ostensibly laid-off workers then file claims based on those ficti 
tious wage payments. This practice is clear and intentional fraud.
•Routine monetary errors due to inaccurately maintained and/or 
submitted payroll data by employers are numerous. Most cause 
small dollar mistakes in claimants' weekly benefit amounts, but 
when added together they are important sources of error, and both 
underpayments and overpayments from this source probably 
exceed fictitious employer losses. In the aggregate, base-period 
wage errors tend to result in just about the same dollars overpaid as 
underpaid.
Losses Due to Separation Violations
Claimants must have been separated from work through no fault of 
their own. Such separations include various categories of quits for 
good cause and discharges without cause. In six states, even claimants 
who quit or were discharged for disqualifying reasons become eligible 
for UI benefits if they remain unemployed long enough. The main type
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of fraud under this category occurs when claimants who quit or were 
legitimately discharged for improper workplace behavior file for bene 
fits alleging "lack of work" and their claims go unchallenged by their 
separating employer.
Leakages Due to Continuing Eligibility Violations
Claimants must be able, available, and actively seeking work, and 
may not refuse an offer of suitable work during each period of unem 
ployment claimed (usually one week). States consider refusal of suit 
able work to be the most serious of these violations and typically 
penalize it by stopping benefits for the remainder of the benefit year 
and canceling wage credits. In practice, this seems to happen infre 
quently. Most continuing eligibility violations occur because claimants 
are unable to work or are unavailable for the week claimed, fail to 
make a proper search for work, or fail to meet the test of being unem 
ployed because of excess earnings or other income. The claimants then 
either fail to inform the agency that they have not met the eligibility 
conditions or consciously give wrong information. In the broadest 
sense, the latter is fraudulent behavior, although, depending on the 
state, much of it may not be considered fraud.
Measurement and Detection of Benefit Payment Errors
The UI program has two principal kinds of systems for identifying, 
estimating, and/or detecting improper benefit payments. These are: (1) 
Benefit Payment Control (BPC) activities and systems, designed to 
detect and deter fictitious employers and individuals who have disqual 
ifying income while in claims status and, where feasible, to recover 
overpaid amounts; and (2) the Benefits Quality Control (BQC) pro 
gram, a sample-based system for estimating the extent and nature of 
improper payments so that deficient processes may be improved.
Benefit Payment Control
All detection and recovery systems come under the common rubric 
of BPC. The systems attempt to detect specific instances of error and
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abuse, and, where the dollar amount involved is large enough to justify 
the cost of pursuit, to initiate recovery procedures. SESAs are encour 
aged to publicize prosecutions for fraud widely to discourage others 
from engaging in such practices.
Systems for Fictitious Employers
For some twenty years, there has been continuing concern about 
detecting—and, more importantly, preventing—the various kinds of 
fictitious employer schemes that could defraud the UI system of mas 
sive sums. The mainstay is the Fictitious Employer Detection System 
(FEDS). It comprises two subsystems. The New Employer/Employee 
Tracking System (NETS) uses data in SESA records to determine 
within 15 weeks of a claim being filed against a new account whether 
that account is legitimate. The Legitimate Employer Claims Analysis 
System (LECAS) identifies for review employers engaging in certain 
suspicious claims patterns, e.g., both the employer and claimant 
addresses were post office boxes.
Because of the age of the FEDS systems, administrators in some 
states believe that sophisticated thieves have identified ways of avoid 
ing detection. Other techniques to spot fictitious employers and similar, 
fictitious claims include monitoring and following up on frequent 
claimant address changes, looking for multiple UI benefit checks 
mailed to a single address, verifying that claimants are not ineligible 
illegal aliens through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement 
(SAVE) program, and using the Enumeration Verification System 
(EVS) to identify persons filing claims with other than their own social 
security numbers.
Systems for Detecting Disqualifying Income
The BPC system also includes mechanisms designed to detect dis 
qualifying income. A person with more than a certain amount of 
income in a week, whether from earnings or most other sources, is inel 
igible for a UI benefit that week. The most significant type of tool used 
for detection is the crossmatch and postaudit. To find claimants with 
disqualifying earnings within their states, most SESAs use the Model 
Crossmatch system, a computer match of the prior six months of claim 
ant records with employer wage records. Five states use the more exten 
sive Benefit Audit, Reporting, and Tracking System (BARTS), which
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allows a full one-year match. Nearly all states use a similar crossmatch, 
called the Interstate Crossmatch/Claimant Locator, each quarter to 
detect individuals making claims in one state while working in another. 
It also allows them to locate persons with outstanding overpayment bal 
ances who have left the state. Because they rely on wage records, these 
crossmatches can detect only private sector work. Depending on their 
laws and economies, some states use similar crossmatches to detect 
ineligible workers in government jobs, including federal, state, county, 
municipal, National Guard, and the military reserves.
All crossmatching systems first detect potential violators, then apply 
variable dollar screens to indicate those with the greatest recovery 
potential. BPC staff verify week-by-week earnings of the indicated 
claimants with employers. The last step is to audit claimants and to set 
up overpayments for recovery as warranted.
Other Crossmatches
States have at their disposal a variety of other systems that use 
crossmatching to detect specific types of disqualifying income or dis 
qualifying conditions. There are social security, workers' compensa 
tion, and Railroad Retirement crossmatch systems for disqualifying 
income. Some states also review or match prison data, death records, 
Job Service hires, and special employer new-hire reports to detect 
other disqualifying conditions.
Less Systematic Approaches
BPC also relies on tips, referrals, and border checks to obtain allega 
tions of fraud and abuse. Staff follow up with audits or investigations.
Estimating the Extent of Improper Payments: The Benefits Quality 
Control Program
The Benefits Quality Control (BQC) program is a system in place 
since 1987 to estimate the extent, kind, causes and responsibilities of 
dollars overpaid by the federal-state UI system. BQC also provides 
estimates of the dollar value of underpayments. Its design evolved in 
three main stages.
In the late 1970s, the UI Service developed measures of initial and 
continued claims accuracy as part of the Performance Standards
434 Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System
Project. Between 200 and 300 randomly sampled claimants were inter 
viewed about both initial and continued claims activities in a review 
"designed to establish that the SESA made proper payments with the 
information that was available or which could have been obtained by 
utilizing proper interviewing techniques" (U.S. Department of Labor 
1976-1977, p. II-8). Measures of initial and continued claims perfor 
mance became part of the UI Quality Appraisal system for assessing 
program performance but were not used to estimate dollars overpaid or 
underpaid.
In 1979, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion (NCUC) funded a pilot test in six cities of a new approach to 
determining payment accuracy. Randomly selected samples of UI ben 
efits were thoroughly analyzed for accuracy to estimate the "true" level 
of improper payments. The examination included in-person contacts 
with the claimant, employers, and third parties to verify pertinent 
information. The investigation also involved a postaudit, similar to the 
current BPC crossmatch, to detect earnings during the claim period. 
This study estimated overpayments at several times the rate BPC 
detected. 3 The U.S. Department of Labor then funded a replication of 
this random audit (RA) study in five states. When statewide findings 
confirmed the results obtained in the pilot study conducted in cities, the 
Department of Labor began extending RA to other states. By 1984, 
forty-six states were conducting random audit investigations, each on a 
minimum of 400 sampled cases per year. Estimated overpayments 
averaged about 12 percent of benefits, implying some $1.5 billion 
overpaid for the system at the time.
In 1983, in response to overpayment issues raised by the U.S. 
Department of Labor Inspector General in connection with RA find 
ings, the department convened an interagency Benefit Payment Over 
sight Committee. The committee recommended that the department 
establish a formal BQC system. The BQC program was phased in vol 
untarily and became mandatory in 1987. Its methodology was adapted 
from RA experience. However, BQC sample sizes were larger and var 
ied by size of state to enable more precise estimates of error types and 
causes. BQC also adopted an explicit commitment to using the data for 
program improvement and compiled a more extensive record on each 
case sampled for this purpose.
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Since 1987, all SESAs except the Virgin Islands have been required 
by regulation to operate BQC programs to assess the accuracy of their 
UI benefit payments. The BQC programs operate as follows: each state 
draws a weekly sample of payments. Annual samples presently aver 
age slightly over 800 cases per state, with a range of 480 to 1,800. A 
specially trained staff reviews SESA records and contacts the claimant, 
employers, and third parties to verify all the information pertinent to 
the benefit amount for the sampled week. Initially, all verifications 
were done in person. Since July 1993, after a pilot test showed that cer 
tain aspects of claims could be verified more efficiently with little loss 
of thoroughness by telephone, investigators have been allowed to use a 
mix of in-person and telephone/fax contacts. Using the verified infor 
mation, investigators determine what the benefit payment should have 
been to accord fully with state law and policy. Any differences between 
the actual and reconstructed amount are underpayment or overpayment 
errors and are recorded in a specially provided computer along with 
their types, causes, and responsibilities. This information is used to 
estimate the extent of improper payments in the state to guide possible 
future program improvements. In FY 1995, states received approxi 
mately $26 million to operate the BQC program.
Estimated and Detected Overpayments
Table 10.1 presents data on estimated and detected benefit overpay 
ments during CY 1994. The BQC estimate covered a $21.2 billion uni 
verse—some 93 percent of all benefit payments, with interstate 
benefits the main area outside its review. In the aggregate, approxi 
mately $1.82 billion, or 8.6 percent, was overpaid. State overpayment 
rates ranged from 1.9 percent to 17.7 percent. About 11 percent of 
BQC-detected overpayments occurred at the monetary determination 
level, 16 percent resulted from separation decisions, and the remaining 
73 percent were due to various continuing eligibility violations. Of the 
eligibility violations, excess earnings during the benefit period and 
other failures to maintain eligibility, principally neglecting to register 
with the Job Service, were most important. Overpayments classified as 
fraud totaled an estimated $390 million (not shown in table).
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Table 10.1 Fiscal year and Calendar Year 1994 Estimated and Detected 
Leakages by Source ($millions)
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For the same time period, BPC activities identified $543 million in 
actual overpayments potentially subject to recovery, of which $220 
million constituted fraud. Since BQC and BPC report data in some 
what different formats, and the methods used to detect 58 percent of 
overpayments ($312 million) were not specified, it is not possible to 
provide the same breakdowns of data on estimated, detected, and 
recovered overpayments. It may be presumed that most of BPC detec 
tions involve excess earnings and other income during the benefit year, 
the aggregate of which BQC estimated at $574 million in 1994. 4 Ficti 
tious employer detections were $6 million, and overpayments identi 
fied through employer protests (mostly involving reason for 
separation) were only $10 million.
Types of Errors in Employer Contributions
UI contributing employers pay a quarterly tax on the wages (up to 
the state's annual maximum wage base) of their covered employees. 
Typically, they receive a quarterly form containing their tax rate from 
the SESA. Employers report total and taxable wages of employees paid 
during the quarter on this form, and return it with the tax payment due. 
Annual earnings exceed the taxable wage base for most workers. In 
1994, earnings taxable for UI amounted to only 36.2 percent of all 
wages paid to workers covered by the UI system. For these taxable 
wages, the main sources of losses in contributions have been (1) errors 
in the tax rate, (2) underreported employees or wages per employee, 
(3) hidden employers, and (4) unpaid or uncollected contributions due.
Errors in the Tax Rate
The fifty-three UI jurisdictions each use one of four basic experi 
ence-rating approaches. The actual rate formulas can be very involved. 
Complexities increase when firms merge or hire workers through 
employee-leasing companies. The U.S. Department of Labor presently 
has no data on the extent of errors in experience-rated taxes or on the 
degree to which such mistakes might cancel one another out in the 
aggregate. A recent internal security panel did, however, identify tax
438 Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System
rate errors as a major UI risk area. 5 Procedures implemented in 1996 to 
assess the quality of tax operations will judge tax rate accuracy. The 
approach adopted involves evaluating the SESA's controls designed to 
ensure tax rate accuracy and determining whether these are operative 
by drawing a small (60 accounts) acceptance sample. However, the 
acceptance sample is not designed to yield an estimate of tax rate 
errors.
Underreported Employees and Wages
Since early in the history of the federal-state UI program, SESAs 
have been required to audit covered employers. The Quality Appraisal 
system set a Desired Level of Achievement (DLA) for the fraction of 
employers audited each year. Remaining at 4 percent for many years, it 
was recently reduced to 2 percent when audit quality standards were 
tightened. Similar to BPC operations, these audits were principally 
designed as an efficient means of ensuring compliance with UI laws 
and timely collection of taxes. During CY 1994, SESAs audited 
129,000 firms, identifying $53 million in underreported contributions 
and $8 million in overreported contributions.
Although existing field audits tend to be cost-effective, SESAs 
select firms for audit in many ways; none of them permit states to esti 
mate the extent of underreporting as BQC does for benefit overpay 
ments. Estimating underreporting has, however, been considered by the 
U.S. Department of Labor and remains under consideration. A model 
for this approach has been tried. In 1989, Illinois estimated 1987 
employer compliance by carefully auditing 875 randomly selected 
firms. Nearly 45 percent of firms had some underreporting error; 13.6 
percent of employees were unreported, with most of them having been 
misclassified as independent contractors. The researchers who con 
ducted the project estimated that covered wages were underreported by 
$1.18 billion (4.2 percent) and contributions by $45 million. Although 
it.was a one-time sample and included only firms headquartered in Illi 
nois, the authors nevertheless concluded that "since reporting require 
ments as well as noncompliance detection probabilities and penalties 
in Illinois are typical of those in other states" the findings may have 
national applicability. 6 An underreporting rate of 4.2 percent for tax-
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able wages, at the 2.6 percent U.S. average tax rate in 1994, implies 
leakages of about $935 million.
Hidden Employers
SESAs routinely pursue many avenues to identify firms that choose 
not to register. These include scanning yellow page listings, reviewing 
business license lists and other tax filings, and conducting additional 
forms of outreach. Many employers are only spotted when claimants 
file for benefits and the agency has no wage records: these are called 
blocked claims. There are no estimates of the potential number of hid 
den employers.
Unpaid Tax Liabilities
Each quarter, about 11 percent of employers provide late wage 
reports and tax payments or fail to report at all. At the end of CY 1994, 
the states had about $1.8 billion in due but uncollected UI taxes. As a 
rule of thumb, most amounts not collected within 15 months will not 
be obtained. At the end of 1994, uncollected taxes of $1.37 billion were 
at least 15 months old. The bulk of receivables remains in SESA 
accounts due to state laws that prohibit removal regardless of age. 
(Some indebtedness can be as much as fifty years old.) In 1994, states 
accrued $2.264 billion in new accounts determined receivable (ADR), 
and collected (liquidated) $2.007 billion, a difference of $257 million. 
Also during that year, they wrote off $239 million as uncollectible, so 
total amounts due grew by only $18 million. It must be noted that 
ADRs, write-offs and liquidations relate to different time periods. Most 
ADRs are terminated within a quarter or two, but some liquidations 
and most write-offs pertain to receivables established years earlier.
Federal Taxes
How well the conclusions of the previous section apply to FUTA 
payments is not known. The two taxes have one major difference: the 
FUTA tax is not experience rated, and thus fewer rate errors should be 
involved. Most employers pay a net FUTA tax rate of 0.8 percent of
440 Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System
each employee's first $7,000 in annual wages. 7 It should also be noted 
that the FUTA tax base of $7,000 applies to the earnings of all workers. 
By contrast, in 1994, thirty-nine states had higher taxable wage bases 
for determining their state UI tax, ranging up to $25,500 in Hawaii.
Administrative Grants
The U.S. Department of Labor provides SESAs with funds for UI 
administration based on forecasts of workload (benefit payment and 
tax collection activities). After a completed quarter, states determine 
whether their workload was high enough to have earned their projected 
funds. If the workload exceeded the amount needed to fund the base 
allocation, states may be entitled to additional contingency funds. Fund 
claims are based on a series of key "workload items," such as initial 
and continued claims taken, nonmonetary determinations made, num 
ber of subject employers, and lower authority appeals. The risk of 
funding misuse arises mostly from inaccurate workload reports. For 
many years, these data have been validated against federal definitions 
through the Workload Validation program to minimize losses through 
overreporting; data from the program are not amenable for use in 
assessing potential leakages from this source.
SESA Administrative Operations
Within SESAs, the bulk of UI administrative effort is directed 
toward accomplishing the primary mission of paying benefits and col 
lecting taxes. The remaining effort is spent on the various housekeep 
ing or overhead functions supporting that mission: personnel activities, 
computer operations, procurement, research and analysis, and evalua 
tion. The major vehicle for examining all of these operations is called 
Internal Security, which comprises a variety of "risk assessments" of 
all SESA functions, including those involving its chief mission. As 
such, Internal Security often overlaps with other assessment or quality 
assurance activities, including BPC, Revenue Quality Control, investi-
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gations or studies spawned by the findings of BQC and various audit 
efforts. Internal Security assessments often lead to internal investiga 
tions and/or audits.
The U.S. Department of Labor recently funded a risk-assessment 
project. In it, Internal Security experts from fifteen states identified and 
ranked internal risks of various sources. Principal risks to benefit pay 
ment integrity involved centralized check-printing and the possibility 
for SESA employees to process UI benefit claims for friends and fam 
ily members. In the tax area, the experts noted numerous weaknesses 
in current centralized cashiering processes, lack of audit trails, lack of 
intact deposits in the field, and poor physical security for staff and 
buildings in the field. In other aspects of agency operations, the report 
noted numerous risks to computer systems: lack of passwords and 
identification numbers or infrequent changes to them, lack of backups 
of key systems and files, ability of dial-up users to change the state UI 
data bases or to obtain information without identifying themselves and 
a general lack of computer controls.
In FY 1995, states reported detecting approximately $1 million in 
UI employee fraud through their internal security operations. Half 
involved SESA administrative funds, most of this lost through embez 
zlement. A total of about $150,000 in misappropriated UI benefits was 
detected, mostly involving improper claims for others. The remainder 
involved contributions, of which misappropriated refunds was the larg 
est source. In addition, SESA staff estimated undetected losses of 
$650,000 and that their controls prevented another $1.7 million from 
being lost.
Trust Fund Operations
The Secretary of the Treasury is trustee for the Unemployment Trust 
Fund (UTF) established under section 904 of the Social Security Act 
(SSA). The UTF contains a separate subaccount for each state. These 
accounts increase with the deposit of UI tax collections from employ 
ers and from interest accruals, and they decrease as states withdraw 
funds to make benefit payments. To avoid having to borrow or to delay 
benefits in recession years when UI payments are high, states are
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encouraged to build up reserve balances in years of low unemploy 
ment. Ideally, reserves would be accumulated by drawing contributions 
from employers when the economy is expanding, and reserves would 
be drawn down by increasing benefit payments that maintain aggregate 
spending during recessions. In chapter 9, the macroeconomic stabiliz 
ing aspect of ideal UI financing is examined.
Funds going into and out of the UTF pass through operational 
accounts for each state: the Clearing Account for tax receipts and Ben 
efit Payment Account for payments. The main risk of losses to or leak 
ages from the trust fund, and therefore to the UI system, comes from 
states that retain balances in operational accounts longer than permit 
ted under applicable federal law (SSA, FUTA, Cash Management 
Improvement Act [CMIA]). In doing this, states are tempted to use 
interest accruals for purposes other than paying benefits or refunding 
employers, proscribed by the so-called "withdrawal standard." Actual 
diversion of funds is always a theoretical risk but in practice is fairly 
easy to detect and would occasion an immediate conformity action.
Inflows into the trust fund through the Clearing Account are subject 
to the "immediate deposit" requirement (FUTA section 3304[a][3] and 
SSA section 303[a][4]). In practice, the U.S. Department of Labor has 
interpreted this by establishing a DLA of two days for transfers from 
the Clearing Account to the trust fund. In FY 1994, thirty-six states met 
or exceeded this DLA: eight typically made transfers within one day. 
Data show that fourteen states failed to meet the DLA (Virgin Islands 
data are unavailable). Their deposits, totaling nearly $7.0 billion, took 
an average of 5.6 days to be deposited in the UTF. This is almost four 
days longer than the standard. At the average interest rate the funds 
would have earned (6.76 percent), this implies losses of $4.6 million to 
the UTF. 8
Until the CMIA of 1990 became effective in 1993, the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor monitored a DLA for withdrawals from the Benefit Pay 
ment Account, similar to the one for Clearing Account transfers. Since 
1993, payment account withdrawals have been managed according to 
individual draw-down agreements between the states and the U.S. 
Treasury. These allow many states to retain cash balances amounting to 
a few days of UI benefit payments in order to defray bank charges. 
Nevertheless, balances for thirteen states averaged only 0.5 days worth 
of payments or less: six states had zero balances. Among the fifty-one
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states that reported, the median balance was 1.6 days of UI benefit pay 
ments, with the maximum being 12 days.
Some Qualification and Measurement Issues
The decision environment of the federal-state UI system is ever 
changing. The general tightness of government budgets has affected 
the availability of UI administrative funding. States have been forced to 
reexamine priorities and to seek less expensive means of paying bene 
fits and collecting taxes. At the same time, technology seems to be 
offering simpler, more convenient, and less costly ways for states to 
make benefit payments. Following the lead of Colorado, several states 
have begun to take UI benefit claims over the telephone. Other states 
have experimented with different alternatives to paying by check. The 
effect of these changes on program integrity and on the willingness and 
ability of states to assess risk is unknown. In the short run, tighter bud 
gets are inducing states to emphasize their basic mission at the expense 
of monitoring integrity. Under the newly proposed comprehensive 
improvement system called UI Performs, the U.S. Department of 
Labor has suggested reducing the benefit payment accuracy sample to 
about half the size used by the BQC program, and allowing states com 
plete flexibility to verify information for sampled units by telephone, 
mail, and fax instead of in person.
The previous sections of this chapter have reviewed the comprehen 
sive range of efforts taken to identify and correct financial leakages 
from the UI system. To identify or measure actual or potential losses, 
states use detection and recovery systems such as BPC and employer 
field audits, as well as estimation systems such as BQC. Nonetheless, 
some gaps and measurement issues remain. Four of these principal 
issues are discussed in the following subsections: (1) the meaning of 
overpayments as measured by the BQC system, (2) the effect of inac 
curately denied claims, (3) the estimation of noncompliance with con 
tribution reporting requirements, and (4) the size of interest losses due 
to excess state cash balances.
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The Meaning of Benefits Quality Control-Estimated Overpayments
The Random Audit BQC methodology estimates proper, under- and 
overpaid continued weeks claimed by extrapolating from estimates 
based on samples of individual weeks paid. The samples are drawn so 
as to provide an accurate cross-sectional picture of payments made in 
every state in every week. Each payment sampled is painstakingly 
reconstructed in accordance with written state law and policy. For 
1994, BQC estimated that, if all payments had been made correctly, UI 
outlays would have been $19.58 billion. That is, actual outlays of 
$21.21 would have been reduced by $1.85 billion of overpayments and 
increased by $0.19 billion of underpayments.
The $1.85 billion estimate of overpayments produced by the quality 
control group needs to be qualified. On the one hand, as a measurement 
vehicle it probably understates overpayments. Over the past three 
years, BQC was unable to verify half of worksearch contacts; accord 
ing to BQC procedures, these are counted as proper. Also, as indicated 
in note 4, the BQC methodology is not as well suited as that of the 
BPC crossmatch and post audit to detecting concealed or underre- 
ported claimant earnings. Conceptually, on the other hand, BQC esti 
mates tend to exaggerate overpayments. Maintaining continuing UI 
eligibility involves the joint fulfillment of two requirements: remaining 
unemployed and satisfying various eligibility conditions imposed by 
state UI law. Although the two conditions coincide closely, the fit is not 
perfect. BQC estimates the numbers of weeks and dollars that should 
not have been paid because eligibility conditions were not fulfilled. 
Many of those claims involving continuing eligibility violations would, 
however, have been paid eventually for individuals with long unem 
ployment terms.
The BQC methodology estimates overpayments by applying state 
UI eligibility provisions and the applicable state penalty structure. This 
approach implies that if claimants, employers, and SESA staff fulfilled 
all program requirements, overpayments and underpayments would be 
eliminated and trust fund outlays would be reduced by the difference 
between the two—which amounted to $1.6 billion in 1994. While this 
assumption is valid for certain kinds of overpayment mistakes, e.g., 
monetary and most separation errors, it is not true for some other 
types.9 Prime examples are failure to register with the Job Service and
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failure to make work search contacts. As an illustration, the typical 
penalty for neglecting to register with the Job Service for a particular 
week is loss of benefit eligibility for the week in question. Following 
state rules, BQC methodology assigns such an improperly paid week 
as an overpayment. However, this penalty typically does not reduce the 
total benefits payable on a claim; it simply delays payment. Further, 
available evidence is clear that relatively few UI claimants become 
reemployed through the Job Service, so the expected reduction in 
length of unemployment from one week's registration with the Job 
Service is much less than one week. The BQC method therefore over 
estimates the savings to the UI Trust Fund if the spell of unemploy 
ment continues beyond the improperly paid week. The case of 
worksearch violations is a similar example, although not as extreme. 
Other, analogous situations could be cited.
The Accuracy of Benefit Denials
The UI system does not assess the accuracy of decisions to deny 
claims with the same intensity as benefit payments are investigated. In 
part, this is because denials are relatively infrequent: in 1994, only one 
in ten initial claims was denied for monetary reasons, one in eight 
monetarily eligible claims was denied for separation reasons, and one 
in sixty-one continued claims was denied for continuing eligibility rea 
sons. Using data in claims files, each year the Quality Performance 
Index (QPI) rates adherence to procedures and application of law and 
policy for separation and continuing nonmonetary eligibility determi 
nations. No field checking is done nor is accuracy per se determined. 
Claims denied for failing monetary eligibility conditions are not 
assessed at all. Thus, BQC's estimate of underpayments remains 
incomplete.
In 1987, the U.S. Department of Labor conducted a five-state pilot 
test of measuring denied claim accuracy using the BQC methodology. 
Initial errors in monetary denials averaged 23 percent and in nonmone 
tary denials about 15 percent before correction through redetermina- 
tion or appeal. No dollar estimates could be attached to these findings. 
As part of the redesign of benefit and tax performance measures to be 
implemented through UI Performs, the accuracy of denial decisions 
will be assessed. In all probability, this will be done using the BQC
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field-verification approach. Pilot testing, due to start in 1997, will pre 
cede nationwide implementation.
Estimating Compliance with Contribution Reporting Requirements
As noted, the accuracy of contribution reports could be estimated by 
a general application of the Illinois model, in which a random sample 
of firms in each state is drawn and audited. An inference could then be 
made about overall compliance. Furthermore, noncompliance profiles 
developed in the process could be used to guide sample selection for 
future audits. Unfortunately, to achieve what is considered reasonably 
satisfactory precision, large audit samples would be needed because of 
the large firm-to-firm variation inherent in audit findings.
Design work by Abt Associates has suggested that stratified random 
samples of approximately 1,600 subject employers should be drawn in 
most states. 10 In the Illinois employer compliance pilot conducted in 
1988, nearly 900 firms were sampled. Taking these as the range for a 
nationwide measurement effort, somewhere between 49,000 and 
85,000 employers would have to be audited. This is a significant share 
of the 129,000 audits actually performed in 1994. The benefits and 
costs of mounting such a measurement effort are still being considered 
within the U.S. Department of Labor.
The Measurement of Foregone Interest from Unemployment Trust 
Fund Transfers
In the section on trust fund operations, an estimate of $4.6 million 
was given as the amount of funds lost by the UTF for fourteen states in 
1994 that failed to meet the DLA of allowing at most two days for 
funds to reside in the clearing account before their transfer into the 
UTF. As noted, there is no comparable DLA for the maximum number 
of days payments should be retained in the Benefit Payment Account. 
A glance at U.S. Department of Labor data shows, however, wide vari 
ation across states in both series. Two states are able to transfer funds 
to the Clearing Account within 0.1 day, and seven states performed this 
task in 1 day or less, but one state took nearly 49 days. In the case of 
the Benefit Payment Account, six states held zero balances and the 
median was 1.6 days, but eight states exceeded 4.5 days with the high-
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est being 12.1 days. Current banking technology permits both swifter 
transfer into the trust fund and much smaller balances in the Benefit 
Payment Account. In light of present technology—as shown by perfor 
mance in many states—foregone interest would seem to be much 
greater than the estimate presented.
Summary and Conclusions
The estimates reported in this chapter suggest that losses to the UI 
system during CY 1994 were approximately $3 billion. This total 
amounted to about 7 percent of total system financial flows in 1994. 
Leakages from benefits were $1.9 billion, over 8 percent of benefit out 
lays. Leakages from the tax stream were composed primarily of esti 
mated underreported contributions ($935 million) and known but 
uncollected contributions ($258 million). These leakages totaled 
approximately $1.2 billion, or 5 percent of state tax collections. For 
reasons outlined earlier in the chapter, estimates of leakages from both 
streams are probably somewhat low.
Despite some underestimates and missing data, the figures for UI 
system financial leakages given in this chapter seem to be in the right 
ballpark. The two largest missing components are underreported FUTA 
taxes and underreported state and FUTA taxes by "hidden" employers. 
A total of some $5.5 billion in FUTA taxes was actually paid in 1994. 
The fixed taxable wage base and tax rate for FUTA suggest that the rate 
of underreporting might be lower than for state UI taxes. If FUTA 
underreporting is of the same magnitude as state contributions, losses 
to the federal Treasury (not UI trust funds) could be on the order of 
$200 million. Hazarding a guess at how large the "hidden employer" 
problem might be is difficult, but for several reasons it might be 
assumed to be rather small. States routinely use many devices to iden 
tify subject employers—various checks with taxing and licensing 
agencies, reviewing classified ads, and the like. Blocked claims investi 
gations turn up others as former employees claim benefits only to find 
their wages not on file with the UI agency. No estimates of these or of 
two other sources—misreporting due to improperly set state tax rates,
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or overpayments in administrative allocations due to overstated work 
load data—have been attempted. Both can be expected to be small.
The UI system's partners tend to have different degrees of concern 
about leakages, with the federal partner, particularly the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, tending to have a higher level. It is vested with over 
sight responsibilities, more detached from operational involvement, 
and more subject to concerns about fraud and abuse in the national 
political arena. It has thus tended to push or induce states to put more 
effort into performance measurement and other forms of integrity 
activities than they would generally select on their own.
Each state sees its response as involving a weighing of responsibili 
ties, benefits, and costs. The first balance the state must strike is 
between operating the basic program and attempting to ensure its 
integrity. The typical SESA sees its primary duty as serving its custom 
ers by paying benefits and collecting taxes. The numerous opportuni 
ties and incentives for leakages created by the interaction of complex 
UI laws and policies and sparse administrative funding levels were 
noted earlier.
In this environment, integrity must be pursued by balancing various 
activities. The first involves integrity or performance measurement. 
The UI agency must have reliable assessments of the extent of under- 
collected or underpaid taxes and of over- and underpaid benefits to 
know how serious are its losses, where they occur, and why. Under 
standing the seriousness of its problem allows it to decide on the rela 
tive balance between operations and integrity activities. It must then 
assess how much energy to devote to further measurement and balance 
initiatives to change its legal framework, improve operational pro 
cesses within a given legal framework, conduct activities designed to 
detect and deter leakages, and recover outstanding balances. At all lev 
els, the U.S. Department of Labor has tried to increase states integrity 
efforts.
In the short run, UI agencies can often do little to change "the sys 
tem"—the complex rules affecting benefit eligibility and tax liability— 
within which they work. For a number of historical reasons, most state 
UI systems have accrued a variety of subtle distinctions defining equi 
table treatment. Students of UI integrity, chief among them Kingston 
and Burgess, have pointed out that program complexity is quite costly, 
especially in terms of administrative effort, inequities among similarly
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situated claimants and employers, and incentives for fraud. They have 
urged states to consider simplifying their UI programs where possi 
ble. 11
Despite the difficulties of altering the system, the results of perfor 
mance measurements have led to changes in this environment. Both the 
Random Audit and BQC programs identified worksearch violations as 
a prime cause of benefit overpayments. (In the early years of Random 
Audit, worksearch issues accounted for an about half of measured 
overpayments.) In response, many states changed their worksearch 
requirements, generally to make them more liberal or to require claim 
ants to receive a formal warning before a worksearch disqualification 
could be assessed. In 1994, work search accounted for only 17 percent 
of national average dollars overpaid, and the decline in work search 
overpayments represented most of the decrease in average overpay 
ments. Changes in law accounted for much of the reduction in errors 
due to work search.
Changes in worksearch laws and policies have reduced worksearch- 
related errors, but the basic structure of incentives and disincentives 
making noncompliance attractive for many claimants and employers 
remains. BQC attributed half of its 1994 estimated overpayments 
solely to intentional or accidental claimant actions. This amounts to 
over $900 million. Adding in joint responsibilities with the UI agency 
or employers raises the figure to $1.2 billion. Employers are responsi 
ble for underreported taxes ($935 million). In addition, over $250 mil 
lion of unpaid taxes could not be collected in 1994. Even though these 
losses largely reflect behavior UI agencies cannot affect directly, their 
size challenges the states and the U.S. Department of Labor to continue 
to address their causes.
Within a given system, states must next decide how much effort is 
warranted to prevent leakages by improving the efficiency of various 
processes. These decisions are generally guided by estimates of the 
size and causes of leakages and should be shaped by considerations of 
cost versus probable effectiveness. Performance measurements have 
played a noticeable role in process change. A salient example comes 
from Random Audit experience. Random Audit findings showed con 
vincingly that states using computerized wage records made more 
accurate monetary determinations than those who requested monetary 
data from employers at the time of initial claims. Partly as a result, the
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number of wage-request states has gone from about a dozen in the 
early 1980s to two at present. Under the Quality Control program, 
states have conducted nearly 150 program improvement studies, 
funded either with grants or supported with BQC staff temporarily 
released from verification duties. They have implemented over 40 of 
the recommended improvements.
State efforts notwithstanding, BQC data suggest a slowing pace of 
improvement in accuracy. When states were first implementing Ran 
dom Audit in the early 1980s, the national average overpayment rate 
was on the order of 12 to 15 percent. The first BQC report was for CY 
1988; overpayments averaged 10.1 percent for the country. They have 
since fallen to about 8.6 percent, as of 1994. If Michigan is excluded, 
however, the decline is from 9 percent in 1988-1989 to 8.1 percent in 
1990-1994. 12 The drop in overpayments due to worksearch violations 
has accounted for the entire decrease in BQC overpayments between 
1988-1989 and 1992-1994, as it seems to have for the decline in Ran 
dom Audit days as well.
Still, BQC data suggest a fertile area for further improvements in 
accuracy does lie within the agencies' direct control. Of the $1.82 bil 
lion overpayments estimated for 1994, SESAs were totally responsible 
for over $400 million. They shared accountability with others, mostly 
claimants, for another $290 million. The extent to which these "costs 
of complexity" can be reduced by process improvements is a direct 
challenge for the future. Many errors involve failure to register claim 
ants with the Job Service. Even perfect registration of claimants would 
have only limited value in shortening unemployment durations for 
claimants.
Again using the calculus of costs versus expected benefits, states 
must decide how much effort should go into detecting and recovering 
overpaid benefits and underpaid taxes. As with many performance 
measurement systems, U.S. Department of Labor assistance, require 
ments, and funding have exerted an important influence on this integ 
rity activity. Although such efforts "clean up" after leakages occur, 
making the system aware of them and their effectiveness is also 
intended to deter claimants and employers from committing fraudulent 
actions in the future. In 1994, BPC activities detected some $540 mil 
lion in actual overpayments, about 30 percent of what BQC estimated 
in total. Of this, some $260 million was recovered. Field audits are the
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main tax equivalent to BPC activities. In 1994, field staff audited about 
130,000 subject employers and identified and recovered $53 million in 
underreported contributions. This is about 6 percent of our rough esti 
mate of the total. Recent experience shows the effect of federal targets 
on this process. In 1990, with a DLA to audit 4 percent of subject 
employers (versus the 1994 DLA of 2 percent, reduced to phase in 
more stringent auditing standards), states conducted 177,000 audits 
and detected $84 million of underreported contributions.
As noted, most estimated overpayments and underreported taxes 
involve evasive behavior by claimants and employers. Massive efforts 
to restructure the UI system's incentives are unlikely. Narrowly defined 
process improvements, at least to improve benefit payment administra 
tion, have had, overall, slight effects on payment accuracy. The most 
productive avenue remaining might thus be more, and more intelligent, 
detection and recovery efforts. Students of UI integrity have concluded 
that much evasive behavior is systematic, and thus liable to detection 
and deterrence by computerized profiling. They have urged this for 
increasing employer compliance with tax reporting laws and for 
screening claimants to focus scrutiny on those persons statistically 
more likely than average to violate various UI eligibility provisions 
(Blakemore et al. 1996; Burgess 1992; Burgess and Kingston 1987, p. 
256). Such work could build on the profiling systems developed to 
identify laid-off individuals who are prone to need extensive reemploy- 
ment assistance and implemented in the past two years. Benefits profil 
ing could use the extensive BQC records. Employer profiling would 
require each state to mount one-time, if not continuing, random audit 
programs of employers as was done in Illinois. The targeted selections 
of workers would help SESAs focus enforcement efforts, information, 
and job search assistance on workers most likely to need them. Tar 
geted employer audits would increase yield. Both should also provide 
more effective deterrence if the activity and results are publicized 
(Kingston, Burgess, and St. Louis 1986, p. 334; Blakemore et al. 1996, 
p. 22).
In the fall of 1995, a joint state-U.S. Department of Labor work 
group proposed a new approach to performance management called UI 
Performs. It is intended to address all dimensions of quality and to 
improve the system's balance between measuring performance and 
taking actions to raise it. UI Performs is built around more federal-state
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cooperation, an explicit commitment to continuous improvement, and 
stronger joint performance planning. When fully implemented in 1998, 
it should provide the system with improved performance measures, 
including an indicator of the accuracy of decisions to deny benefits. It 
also incorporates initiatives nearing completion to improve benefits 
timeliness, quality measures, and tax performance. The incentive to 
analyze experience and make program improvements will be strength 
ened by a more comprehensive planning process. By inducing the U.S. 
Department of Labor and states to look more broadly and in a balanced 
way at total performance, UI Performs has the potential to help stanch 
leakages at all levels, possibly through such innovative approaches as 
greater targeting of compliance efforts.
NOTES
The author would like to express his appreciation to reviewer Paul Burgess for his helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of the chapter He is also grateful to Steve Wandner and Chris O'Leary 
for their extensive editorial assistance.
1 For a concise, thorough statement of the incentives and disincentives for compliance with 
benefit eligibility provisions, see Burgess (1992) A more complete treatment is Burgess and 
Kingston (1987), especially chapter 6. A review of incentives for employers to comply with con 
tribution reporting requirements is given in Blakemore et al. (1996)
2 In 1996, the BQC was renamed the Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program
3. See Kingston and Burgess (1981), especially table 15.
4 Conceptually, the BPC wage record crossmatch is a more thorough mechanism for detect 
ing benefit-year earnings than BQC. BQC identifies earnings directly through the claimant inter 
view (and so depends on claimant honesty) and indirectly through various employer verifications. 
The BPC crossmatch obtains positive matches on all work reflected in wage record data. In prac 
tice, however, crossmatch programs screen out instances where abuse is likely to involve small 
dollar amounts; additionally, agency staff cannot afford to investigate many other low-potential 
"hits " The 1979 pilot that developed Random Audit included a crossmatch and postaudit. Based 
on one quarter's crossmatch, these raised detected overpayments by 0 to 20 percent (average: 7 
percent). Because of the small average effect, and the large delay it occasioned in case comple 
tions, this feature was not included in either Random Audit or BQC
5. See California Employment Development Department (1995)
6. See Blakemore et al (1996) The authors note that the Illinois study could not help but 
underestimate the rate of underreporting Illinois could not audit firms headquartered out of state, 
and this knowledge may have affected their compliance. Of course, the study also included only 
registered employers, so noncomphance by "hidden" employers could not be estimated.
7. The actual FUTA tax rate is 6 2 percent. Employers pay 0.8 percent if they remit the correct 
amount of state taxes in a timely manner and the state is eligible for the offset credit of 5.4 per 
cent
8. The U.S. Department of Labor is now investigating an additional avenue by which interest 
may be lost by the UTF In some states, additional accounts may be maintained by non-UI agen 
cies that collect UI taxes. These accounts can be the repository of UI funds before they are trans-
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ferred to the standard clearing account. Such accounts can therefore both delay the deposit of 
monies into the fund and affect how accurately the timeliness of transfer from the Clearing 
Account can be measured
9. This general issue was first raised by Burgess, Kingston, and St. Louis (1982, pp. 37-39) in 
the context of how much tighter UI administration might reduce trust fund outlays.
10. See Marcus and Battaglia (1990) and subsequent analyses.
11. See Burgess and Kingston (1987), especially chapters 3 and 8.
12. Michigan data, although questionable, were published in 1988, publication was suspended 
in 1989-1992 and only resumed in 1993 when the state achieved adequate BQC quality. The bulk 
of Michigan overpayments involve "other eligibility" failures, mostly failure to register claimants 
with the Job Service
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